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Abstract: One can often hear Polish politicians saying there is no violence against women in Poland, 
since Polish men respect their women and women hold a strong position in Polish culture. The convic-
tion rates for domestic abuse in Poland are indeed low, though the attrition rates are high. Every year, 
for approximately 75,000 registered cases of domestic violence, there are roughly 10,000 convictions. 
Most of the prison sentences are conditionally suspended. Protective orders or other punitive meas-
ures are seldom handed down. There is a visible reluctance on the part of the criminal justice system to 
punish and correct domestic abusers. One of the reasons is that domestic abuse provisions in the Polish 
Penal Code (Article 207 of the Polish Penal Code from 1997) criminalises a very different behaviour 
than is defined in the Counteracting Family Violence Act from 2005. Another, possibly even greater, 
reason is the culture of sentencing (both in general and of domestic abuse) within the Polish judici-
ary and the very strong conservatism of Polish decision-makers and society. The protection of family 
values by legislators and the judiciary is often enforced at the expense of the victims’ right to life and 
to a life free from violence. This article discusses the Polish system for preventing domestic violence, 
which was set up in 2005 and the construction and jurisprudence of crime described in Article 207 of 
the Polish Penal Code. In particular, the question of culpability raises many problems when it comes 
to prosecution. First, we must compare Article 207 with the definition of ‘family violence’ specified in 
the Counteracting Family Violence Act and the Istanbul Convention. Then, I will explain how such an 
understanding and interpretation of Article 207 translates into the dynamics of sentencing and penal 
decision-making and the virtual ineffectiveness of both penal provisions (the lack of deterrent effect) 
and the system of counteracting family violence designed by lawmakers.
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Abstrakt:  Powszechnie przyjmuje się, że art. 207 kodeksu karnego kryminalizujący znęcanie się 
nad najbliższymi osobami jest formą kryminalizacji przemocy domowej w polskim ustawodawstwie 
karnym. Jednak czy tak jest w  istocie? Gdy Polska ratyfikowała konwencję stambulską (Konwen-
cja Rady Europy ws. zwalczania przemocy domowej i przemocy wobec kobiet, CETS 210) w 2015 r. 
uznano, że nasze ustawodawstwo odnośnie do przemocy domowej spełnia wymogi konwencji, jeśli 
chodzi o zintegrowane, kompleksowe i  skoordynowane ogólnokrajowe strategie obejmujące środki 
mające na celu zapobieganie wszelkim formom przemocy objętych zakresem konwencji. Pod wzglę-
dem ścigania aktów przemocy domowej uznano, że art. 207 jest wystarczającym instrumentem praw-
nokarnym, by zadośćuczynić wymogom konwencji. W  artykule przedstawię polski system prze-
ciwdziałania przemocy w rodzinie ustanowiony w ustawie z 2005 r. oraz zarysuję wzajemne relacje 
między systemem z ustawy o przeciwdziałaniu przemocy w rodzinie a regulacjami prawnokarnymi, 
a dokładnie to, czy zachowanie stypizowane w art. 207 k.k. pokrywa się z ustawową definicją prze-
mocy w rodzinie. Te relacje bardzo wyraźnie obrazują liczby, które pokazują, że państwo polskie nie 
jest specjalnie responsywne na przemoc domową, a owa niska responsywność tylko po części wynika 
z  niedoskonałych przepisów prawa, a  w  ogromnej części z  pewnej inercji podmiotów stosujących 
prawo, archaicznej wykładni znamion omawianego przestępstwa i braku woli politycznej.
Słowa kluczowe:  przemoc domowa, przemoc wobec kobiet, Polska, prawo karne, konwencja 
stambulska
Introduction
One often can hear in Poland politicians saying that there is no violence against 
women in Poland, since Polish men respect their women and women hold a strong 
position in Polish culture and within the family. The conviction rates for domestic 
abuse in Poland are indeed low, though the attrition rates are high. Every year, for 
approximately 75,000 registered cases of domestic violence (DV), there are roughly 
10,000 convictions. Most of the prison sentences are conditionally suspended. 
Protective orders or other punitive measures are seldom handed down. There is 
a visible reluctance on the part of the criminal justice system to punish and correct 
domestic abusers.
When Poland ratified the Istanbul Convention (Council of Europe Conven-
tion on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence) 
in 2015, it was said that our domestic violence laws complied with the Conven-
tion’s requirements. Poland was said to be in compliance with the obligations of 
the Istanbul Convention in terms of providing comprehensive and coordinated 
policies which encompass all relevant measures to prevent and combat all forms 
of violence covered under the scope of this Convention and which offer a holistic 
response to violence against women (VAW). The only legal modification that was 
made by the legislature was to introduce ex officio prosecution for rape, which pre-
viously had to be initiated upon a complaint filed by the victim.
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Article 5.2 of the Convention provides an obligation to punish (criminalise) 
acts of violence covered by the Convention: ‘Parties shall take the necessary legis-
lative and other measures to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, punish, 
and provide reparation for acts of violence covered by the scope of this Convention 
that are perpetrated by non‐State actors.’
In terms of prosecuting DV, Poland was said to comply with the provisions of 
the Istanbul Convention, thanks to Article 207 of the Penal Code from 1997. So 
it was said, though the provision in question refers to behaviours that fall within 
what we call domestic abuse. This paper discusses the legal framework of DV pro-
visions in Poland, presents numbers that show high attrition rates, and finally ana- 
lyses the why the criminal justice system is nonresponsive towards domestic abuse.
Perhaps the statement that only a  small proportion of domestic abusers are 
convicted is not exceptionally insightful or illuminating, nor is it only a peculiar-
ity of the Polish system. The interesting question is why this is so. It seems that one 
of the reasons is the construction of the basic legal provision designed to cover DV, 
i.e. Article 207.
In particular, the question of culpability raises many challenges when it comes 
to prosecution. Firstly, we must look up the interpretation of Article 207 and the 
definition of ‘family violence’ specified in the Counteracting Family Violence Act. 
Finally, one has to explain how the understanding and interpretation of Article 207 
translates into the dynamics of sentencing and penal decision-making.
The paper is based on available data from two separate systems of reaction the 
so-called Blue Card data and criminal records. The difference between the two indic- 
ates a significant gap and raises doubts as to the adequacy of criminal responses, 
besides the more universal problem of the effectiveness of criminalising DV.
The quote in the title – by the government spokesperson in 2017, Beata 
Mazurek, commenting on the high-profile case of intimate partner violence by the 
local politician Rafał Piasecki – serves as a very accurate illustration of the solu-
tions we have in Poland: ‘I wish that in cases where there is an abuse of violence 
against women, the justice system worked efficiently’ (TVN24 2017).
1. The criminalisation of domestic violence
Domestic violence, and intimate partner violence in particular, is a  social phe- 
nomenon that affects a broad cross-section of the world’s population. It is not merely 
a social, political, or public health problem, but a very violation of our human rights, 
protected by international law. When it comes to Europe, there have been several 
sentences from the European Court of Human Rights to hold Council of Europe 
member states accountable for not providing protection and criminal recourses 
for victims of domestic violence (e.g. Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria 71127/01 from 
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12 June 2008; Opuz v. Turkey 33401/02 from 9 June 2009; Eremia and others v. The 
Republic of Moldova 3564/11 from 28 May 2013). The state is thus internationally 
obliged to provide victims with protection and to punish perpetrators.
Currently in the Western world, no-one denies the urge to punish domestic 
violence. To the contrary, the problem is rather that some states rely excessively 
on criminal justice responses whilst overlooking the complexity of the problem 
and the issues of social justice (Goodmark 2018). Instead of solving the problem, 
it exacerbates it.
In the past few decades there has been a co-optation of the feminist agenda 
with the emergent political and penal paradigms of ‘governing through crime’ 
(Simon 2007), the neoliberal penal state (Wacquant 2009), or the late-modern 
‘cultures of control’ (Garland 2001). It was visible not only in the United States, 
although the issue has so far been the most pronounced, perceived, and studied 
there. The feminist theorists have begun to explore how the feminist movement/
agenda in the United States helped to facilitate the carceral state and how it was 
used to legitimise and justify the expansion of the crime control agenda and puni-
tive policies of the contemporary state (Gottschalk 2006; Gruber 2007; Bumiller 
2008; Bernstein 2012).
A trend of excessive reliance on the criminal justice system to eradicate VAW 
in the USA was coined ‘carceral feminism’ (Bernstein 2012) and in the Latino 
world ‘punitive feminism’ (feminismo punitivo, Larrauri 2007). It refers to a ‘fem-
inism’ that calls for the criminalisation of the perpetrator and a harsher punitive 
response towards any acts of VAW. The underlying logic relies on increased poli- 
cing, legal frameworks and state intervention, and harsher punishments as appro-
priate responses to prevent VAW while simultaneously overlooking other non- 
-punitive social measures to prevent such violence.
Once the victims’ rights movement and discourse emerged in the public sphere 
in the late 1970s, it quickly took over feminist concerns for protecting women from 
violence and used them to achieve its own goals. Such a deviation/diversion from 
the primary goals of the feminist movement and the feminist alliance with the 
penal function of the state – a joining of forces with the neoliberal project of social 
control (Bumiller 2008: 15) – has proved to be adverse to women themselves. The 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), enacted in 1994, solidified the under-
standing of VAW as a principally criminal matter and was applauded by conser- 
vative political forces as another powerful symbol of the war on crime (Gottschalk 
2006: 152).
The ‘zero tolerance’ and tough-on-crime approach in cases of domestic abuse 
encompassed harsh measures that hardly improved women’s safety, but instead 
make them more vulnerable and disempowered in their lives – shifting control 
over their lives from their abusive husbands to a  paternalist state and criminal- 
ising their victimisation (Chesney-Lind 2006: 14). For example, in the USA, there 
is evidence that mandatory arrests, no-drop policies, and expanded definitions of 
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violence adopted by police departments have resulted in a greater risk for battered 
women to be arrested for domestic assault and the criminalisation of women who 
were merely defending themselves1 (Chesney-Lind 2006: 16). Furthermore, these 
policies have increased the probability that state protection agencies will remove the 
children of abused women from their homes after reports of violence which they 
could not be protected from witnessing or becoming the victims of (Gottschalk 
2006:  160). Additionally, abused women who live in public housing (abused by 
their non-resident partners) face eviction when reporting violence for exposure to 
violence of her neighbours (Simon 2007: 197).
Framing VAW as mainly a  legal and law enforcement problem was useful in 
terms of deviating attention from the shrinking social functions of the state and its 
welfare resources which actually could better address the needs of abused women, 
and in a  much less constraining way. The emphasis of DV criminalisation has 
come at the cost of deflecting focus from economic empowerment, education, and 
other non-punitive goals (Gruber 2007: 819). By embracing harsh criminalisation 
policies and resorting to the penal apparatus of the neoliberal paternalistic state 
without addressing any larger social issues or underlying conditions that are root 
causes of VAW (economic empowerment, education, or gender stereotypes), the 
state reinforces inequality rather than dismantling it, and so strays from the under-
lying values of the feminist movement – the equality and autonomy of women.
On the other hand, this inclusion of a  feminist agenda in a penal and crime 
control framework also might be seen as policymakers’ symbolic recognition of 
the importance of the problem. In times of late (Giddens 1990) or liquid (Bauman 
2000) modernity, when we are witnessing the decline of the power of the traditional 
sovereign state, criminal law has become the last powerful tool by which the state 
can assert its power. Globalisation and neo-liberal policies increased the exclusion 
and hardship of specific social groups, thus creating new problems of order and 
new fears and anxieties (Garland 2001: 153). The criminalisation of social prob-
lems, in situations when social policies and resources are no longer available (and 
certainly not as effective or spectacular) to address the social conditions that pro-
duced them, has become the easiest way to demonstrate the state’s power (or effic- 
acy of politicians) and its concern for the well-being and safety of its citizens.
Addressing VAW as a mainly criminal matter is yet another example of ‘govern-
ing through crime’. This in fact means making crime (criminal law, crime control 
field, and popular crime narratives) available outside its original, limited subject 
domains and making it a powerful tool with which to interpret and frame all forms 
of social action as a problem of governance (Simon 2007: 17). When something is 
1 For example, because of dual arrest policies, which refers to situations where police officers 
cannot identify the primary aggressor, and detains both parties. Law enforcement agencies developed 
an expansive definition of DV that fails to distinguish between aggressive/instigating violence and self- 
-defensive/retaliatory violence (Chesney-Lind 2006: 16).
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framed as a problem of governance, the suggestion is that it is possible to regulate 
or solve by political and immediate measures.
This trend – an alliance, or rather appropriation, of the feminist agenda by 
‘tough-on-crime’ politicians – however, was not observed in Poland. Despite the 
Polish politicians’ readiness to resort to criminal law for any social problem in the 
last two decades (Grzyb 2017), they never brought DV into play in such a way. The 
system of prevention beginning in 2005 does not resort to criminal law, although 
many effective remedies are in fact only available to the victims when they decide 
to start criminal proceedings.
2. Preventing domestic violence in Poland
Since 2005, when the Sejm adopted the Counteracting Family Violence Act, there 
has been a dual track for reacting to domestic violence. The system for counteract-
ing family violence (Polish lawmakers adopted the term ‘family violence’) which 
was enacted in the bill is run by the public administration and the criminal justice 
track. These two tracks do not actually overlap, though the key role in both cases is 
assigned to the police.
The Counteracting Family Violence Act of 29 July 2005 established a system 
of comprehensive measures and obligations of the public institutions (at both the 
central and local levels) to protect victims of domestic violence.
Article 2.2 of this law defines ‘family violence’ as a single or recurring wilful 
action or negligence which infringes upon the personal rights or well-being of the 
persons listed in Point 1 (i.e. a family member – a close relative or other person 
sharing the residence or household), in particular, exposing them to the risk of 
losing life or health, compromising their dignity, physical integrity, or freedom – 
including sexual freedom – causing harm to their physical or mental health, and 
causing pain and moral suffering in those who are subjected to violence.
Given the definition of DV enacted by Article 3(b) of the Istanbul Convention,2 
the Polish provision omits economic abuse and also overlooks the problem of 
violence between former intimate partners who do not live together or do not 
share households.
2 Article 3 of the Istanbul Convention defines VAW and DV as follows:
•	 ‘violence against women’ is understood as a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination 
against women and shall mean all acts of gender‐based violence that result in, or are likely to result 
in, physical, sexual, psychological, or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats of 
such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life
•	 ‘domestic violence’ shall mean all acts of physical, sexual, psychological, or economic violence that 
occur within the family or domestic unit or between former or current spouses or partners, whether 
or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the victim.
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The lawmakers adopted a gender-neutral approach, which is to say there is not 
a single reference throughout the whole document to the fact that women are more 
likely to suffer from DV and that men are more likely to perpetrate it. The Act uses 
the neutral term ‘victim’.
Under the provisions of the Act, a  person suffering from DV is entitled to 
several forms of assistance (Art.  3):  medical, psychological, legal, social, profes-
sional, and family counselling; crisis intervention and support; protection from 
further harm by preventing the abusers from using a home occupied jointly with 
other family members and prohibiting contact with a victim via restraining orders 
to stay away from them; safe shelter in a specialised support centre for victims of 
DV; medical examination to identify the causes and types of injuries resulting from 
DV and to issue a medical certificate in that respect; assistance in finding a place to 
live for people who experience DV and do not have legal title to the premises occu-
pied with the perpetrator. The perpetrators instead shall be subjected to measured 
aimed at preventing contact with the victims and at corrective and educational 
measures (Art. 4).
In general, the Act is in line with the standards set by the Istanbul Convention; 
therefore, when Poland signed and ratified the Convention in 2015, no changes 
were made.
A key procedure in response to family violence enacted in 2005 is the ‘Blue Card’ 
procedure (Article 9d). A Blue Card is a  form of intervention within the family 
where DV occurs. It is a procedure that provides assistance to a family affected by 
violence, both those suffering and those inflicting violence. The approach adopted 
by the lawmakers and in the Blue Card procedure identifies DV not only as a legal 
problem, but also a health, psychological, and social problem.
The procedure takes a comprehensive and coordinated approach. It is run by 
an interdisciplinary council at the municipality level, composed of representat- 
ives from 1) social welfare, 2) municipality committees for solving alcohol prob-
lems, 3) the police, 4) education institutions, 5) healthcare institutions, and 6) non- 
-governmental organisations (Article 9a).
The Blue Card system was initially introduced in 1998 to regulate police inter-
vention and interaction with families experiencing DV. The questionnaire was 
printed on blue paper, hence the name of the procedure. Originally, in the mid-90s 
it was intended to detect alcohol-related DV, provide some assistance to affected 
families, and monitor the family situation.
Until 2010 such procedures were initiated by the police. After a 2010 amend-
ment to the Act, the procedure can be initiated by a social worker, healthcare pro-
fessional, or other public functionary, although almost 80% of all Blue Card cases 
are still initiated by the police (MRPiPS 2019: 173).
The Blue Card procedures shall be initiated by means of filling in the Blue Card 
form in the event of a suspicion of domestic violence arising in the course of per-
forming professional tasks, or as a  result of notification by a  family member or 
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a witness to domestic violence (Art. 9d.4). To open a case, the consent of the victim 
is not required (Art. 9d.1).
The Blue Card form is comprised of forms entitled A, B, C, and D. Form A is 
the report of the police intervention itself or of the professional initiating the pro-
cedure. It is done in the presence of the victim. Form B is a useful piece of informa-
tion for the victim, describing the violence, her rights, and the places she can seek 
help. Form C is completed at the meeting of an interdisciplinary team (or working 
group) in the presence of the suspected victim, acting as a  kind of diagnosis of 
the situation and a personalised assistance plan tailored to the individual victim. 
Form D, finally, is also filled in by the professionals during the meeting, in the pres-
ence of the suspected perpetrator of the violence. During the course of the case and 
the realisation of the assistance plan, the family is monitored and assisted by the 
police officers and/or social workers. The procedure is deemed complete when the 
interdisciplinary team decides the plan has been executed and that further actions 
are unwarranted or the problem has been solved.
Besides the Blue Card procedure, the Counteracting Family Violence Act 
imposes obligations on both local authorities – the development and implement- 
ation of a programme for preventing DV (Art. 6) – and the central administra-
tion – developing a National Programme for the Prevention of Domestic Violence 
(Art. 8) – as well as providing infrastructure for the victims (e.g. support centres) 
and developing corrective and educational measures for perpetrators (Art. 6.4).
The Act also provides specific measures in cases of violence, i.e. eviction orders 
issued by a civil court on the demand of the victim (Art. 11a). Social workers also 
have the right to remove a child from a family in the event of a direct risk to the 
child’s life or health due to domestic violence (Art. 12a). When a perpetrator of 
violence is on parole or probation for committing acts of violence or threats against 
family members, the probation officer also has the right to file a motion to execute 
the penalty of imprisonment or to revoke the parole (Art. 12d).
Finally, in the event a  professional suspects an offence of injuries or do- 
mestic abuse in the course of performing their duties, the professional shall report 
it as a  crime to the police, or a  police officer shall initiate criminal proceedings 
(Art. 12). It needs to be emphasised that opening a Blue Card case, even by a police 
officer, does not at all equate to pressing criminal charges against the perpetrator. 
The provisions of Article 12, the Act, and the system for preventing domestic viol- 
ence do not have recourse at any time to the criminal justice system.
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3. Prosecuting domestic violence in Poland
The second track of addressing domestic violence is to start criminal proceedings. 
When a person experiences domestic abuse, apart from opening a Blue Card case, 
they may press charges against the perpetrator.
In the Polish Penal Code of 1997, Article 207 criminalises offences of maltreat-
ment of family members or vulnerable persons, which is described as ‘domestic viol- 
ence crime’. Otherwise, a victim may press charges for some other offences: injury 
(Art. 157), punishable threats (Art. 191), or rape (Art. 197); however, Article 207 is 
deemed to be the basic type for behaviour which falls under DV, and it represents 
the majority of convictions (which is elaborated on later).
Starting criminal proceedings and reaching a  conviction – apart from the 
penalty – provides the judge with several options regarding the perpetrators of 
domestic abuse which aim to protect the victim. Along with a conviction, the court 
may (although it is not mandatory) issue
•	 a restraining and barring order
 – prohibiting the guilty party from contacting certain individuals,
 – prohibiting them from approaching certain individuals, or
 – prohibiting them from leaving a specific area without the court’s permission 
[Art. 39.2b], or
•	 an eviction order – the order to vacate the premises which the guilty party 
shares with the victim [Art. 39.2e].
An eviction order may be issued by the prosecutor before a conviction. The 
police, however, have no right to issue an eviction or restraining order in emer-
gency situations, during police intervention.
Furthermore, when conditionally suspending the enforcement of the penalty 
imposed, the court may impose an obligation:
5) to abstain from abusing alcohol or from using other stupefacient substances
6) to submit to treatment (e.g. for alcoholism) or to therapeutic activities
6a) to participate in correctional/educational activities (therapy for domestic 
abusers)
7) to refrain from associating with specific social groups or visiting specific loca-
tions
7a) to refrain from contacting the harmed party or from approaching them 
[Art. 72]
At first glance, it seems that Polish criminal law does adequately address the 
problem of domestic violence. The Penal Code does criminalise the conduct of 
domestic abuse or other forms of violence against family members. The senten- 
cing rules and existing measures (i.e. barring and protection orders) do not aim to 
merely punish the perpetrators, but also to protect the victims.
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However, all of these measures or obligations that often proved to be efficient 
deterrents rather than ‘just deserts’ in terms of stopping and preventing further 
abuse are seldom imposed and only used in criminal proceedings, even if some of 
them can be issued before the sentencing phase. That is to say, they are not avail-
able for victims who have had a Blue Card procedure initiated but who have not 
pressed charges.
Only in April 2020 the Polish house of parliament passed a  law providing 
immediate restraining and eviction orders for the perpetrators of domestic abuse 
issued by police officers upon intervention (up to 14  days) (Ministry of Justice 
2020). The law is expected to come into force in 2020.
Moreover, in fact, a provision in Polish Penal Code regarding domestic abuse 
(Article 207 of the Polish Penal Code from 1997) criminalises a  very different 
behaviour than is defined in the Counteracting Family Violence Act of 2005. The 
numbers on DV and attrition rates clearly demonstrate the discrepancy.
4. Domestic violence figures in Poland
Because DV has a very high proportion of unreported cases, victimisation surveys 
can be a  reliable source of information on its prevalence. The rates obtained in 
surveys may differ, but presenting these numbers is a good starting point for dis-
cussing the official number of reported cases.
4.1. Victimisation surveys
The first Polish victimisation survey on VAW was conducted by Beata Gruszczyńska 
(2007:  58–63) in the framework of the International Violence Against Women 
Survey (IVAWS). The survey was carried out in 2004 among a  sample of 2,000 
women aged 18–70. The results revealed that 34.6% of women had experienced 
physical or sexual violence in their lifetime, out of which 15.6% were victimised by 
their partner. Physical violence was experienced by 18.1% of respondents, 15.1% of 
which was from their partner. Within the 12 months prior to the survey, 5.1% of 
respondents had experienced physical violence, and 1.6% sexual violence.
Slightly different, though comparable, rates were reported in the ‘Violence 
against women: An EU-wide survey’, published by the Fundamental Rights Agency 
in 2014. The survey was conducted on a European sample of 42,000 women (over 
15 years of age) from EU28 countries – approx. 1,500 women from each country 
– and covered a wide range of abuse: physical abuse, sexual abuse, psychological 
violence, stalking, and sexual harassment. The study found that 13% of women 
had experienced physical or sexual violence from a partner since the age of 15 (4% 
within the previous 12 months), 11% from a non-partner, and 19% overall from 
173‘We condemn abusing violence against women’: The criminalization of domestic violence in Poland 
a partner or non-partner. 37% of women reported having been subjected to psy-
chological violence (FRA 2014).
The third survey worth mentioning is the study commissioned in 2014 by the 
Polish Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Policy, which is in charge of coordin- 
ating the system for preventing domestic violence. It was carried out on a sample 
of 3,000 men and women who were asked about physical, psychological, sexual, 
and economic violence. According to that study, 26.8% of women and 22.3% of 
men had experienced violence within their lifetime. Of the respondents, 16.8% had 
experienced physical violence, 20.3% psychological violence, and 2.7% sexual viol- 
ence. In a very similar study commissioned by the Ministry of Family, Labour, and 
Social Policy in 2010, 39.4% of women reported experiencing violence during their 
lifetime (Miedzik and Godlewska-Szurkowa 2014: 68).
4.2. Blue Card statistics
Another source of information are the Blue Card statistics published annually by 
the Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Policy. Thanks to an amendment of the 
Counteracting Family Violence Act made in 2010, comparable statistics have been 
collected since 2012. One can tell there is quite a stable trend. Each year, between 
90,000 and 100,000 Blue Card cases are started. One-fifth (18.4% in 2014) of them 
are reports on subsequent incidents, and four-fifths (81.6% in 2014) are new cases.3 
Based on police records, 92% of the perpetrators are men and 70% of the victims 
are women (a further 15% are children).
The efficiency of Blue Card procedures is rather low. Every year, there are 
approximately 70,000 Blue Cards are finalised, 70% of them because the violence 
has stopped or there are reasonable grounds to believe it has stopped, and 30% 
because there is no reason to take further action. In 2016, the Supreme Audit Office 
(Polish constitutional agency) published a  report on assistance and services for 
victims of DV and an evaluation of the Blue Card procedure. The report revealed 
that in only 2.6% of the cases studied did the violence stop; in 13% of cases a com-
pleted procedure had been reopened (NIK 2016: 11). Nonetheless, 61% of people 
receiving assistance said their situation had somehow improved or they were 
feeling better, and only 1.5% were feeling worse.
3  While interpreting Blue Card statistics, one must bear in mind a few reservations. The stat- 
istics are collected on the basis of completed forms A, C, and D. The numbers presented here refer 
to A forms, which technically initiate the procedure. Firstly, if the interdisciplinary team in its work 
discovers that the suspect was not the perpetrator, this fact is not reflected in the statistics. Secondly, 
a procedure in one year can pertain to one family in different configurations. It may happen that one 
person is simultaneously a victim and a perpetrator (e.g. they may suffer violence from their partner 
and inflict violence on their child). Thirdly, there is sometimes the problem of mutual accusations – 
a wife opens a Blue Card case against her husband, and vice versa. All of these issues require caution 
from researchers whilst interpreting Blue Card statistics.
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Table 1. The Blue Card procedure
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Number of Blue Card 
forms 63,820 73,119 99,093 99,749 97,224 98,307 93,311
Number of Blue Card 
forms filled in by the 
police
51,236 61,047 77,808 75,495 73,531 75,662 73,153
Number of 
perpetrators (only 
police Blue Card 
records)
51,531 61,450 78,489 74,155 74,155 76,206 73,654
Number of victims 105,332 97,501 91,789 92,529 88,133
Percentage of female 
victims 69.1 71.15 72.9 73.47 73.8
Source: Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Policy [MRPiPS] (2015; 2019).
The Blue Card statistics suggest that each year there are at least 60,000–70,000 
recorded cases of Article 207 offences or related crimes. This is not the case, though. 
These numbers are in stark contrast with the criminal justice statistics.
4.3. Criminal Justice Statistics
It is still virtually impossible to count all convictions related to DV, since the courts 
are not obliged to mention in their sentences that an offence was committed in the 
context of DV, which would subsequently be a  ticked box in the statistics. Since 
2011, it has been possible to extract from judicial statistics figures on crimes com-
mitted against an immediate family member, e.g. injuries, threats, or rape, but 
that joint qualification is still not mandatory for judges in the sentencing phase or 
during statistical reporting. Nevertheless, there is a growing tendency among the 
judiciary to indicate such cases in their sentences.
Moreover, it is important to emphasise that not every conviction from Article 
207 §1 was related to DV. Article 207 protects family members and vulnerable 
persons from maltreatment; thus, the victim may be a student maltreated by a pro-
fessor or an employee harassed by a superior, though these are a tiny proportion of 
all cases. To illustrate the breakdown, in 2018 70.3% of all convictions for crimes 
related to DV were for Article 207 §1 (Lewoc 2019), and among all convictions for 
Article 207 §1, 88.6% (in the final judgement, 84% in the first instance) were for 
maltreatment of a family member.
Thus, despite the fact that Article 207 of the Penal Code does not include all 
recorded cases that can be considered DV, it still remains the basic penal provi-
sion for addressing DV. Therefore, Article 207 figures remain the most accurate 
175‘We condemn abusing violence against women’: The criminalization of domestic violence in Poland 
portrayal of criminal justice. In particular, §1 (and since 2016, §1a as well) of 
Article 207 covers the vast majority of cases tried in relation to domestic abuse.
Table 2. Numbers of reported and recorded crimes (police records) and judicial 
statistics on adjudications (first instance) and final convictions (second instance)
Article 207 §1,  
Penal Code 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Reported crimes 30,534 29,958 29,193 29,879 30,901 27,642 26,633 28,608 28,014
Recorded crimes 18,759 18,832 17,785 17,513 17,523 14,191 15,513 15,730 14,797
Adjudications
(first instance) 16,239 13,588 11,937 14,132 15,001 14,400 12,846 13,252 13,422
Convictions  
(final judgments) 13,484 13,153 12,318 11,593 11,282 10,533 10,572 9,755 10,450
Source: Ministry of Justice, Bureau of Statistics.
Out of 10,450 convicted individuals in 2018 (final judgements) for Art. 207 §1:
•	 221 were sentenced to mixed penalties,
•	 397 were given a fine,
•	 1,895 were sentenced to community service, and
•	 7,937 were sentenced to imprisonment.














Source: Ministry of Justice, Bureau of Statistics.
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Table 3. Length of prison sentence
Imprisonment Total: 7,937 100%
3–12 months 7,415 93.4%
1–2 years 460 5.8%
2–5 years 62 0.8%
Source: Ministry of Justice, Bureau of Statistics.
The offence of maltreatment of an immediate family member is punishable by 
between 3 months and 5 years of imprisonment. Most of the prison sentences are 
for the mandatory minimum sentence, up to one year (93.4%). Furthermore, 67% 
(5,319) of all prison sentences are conditionally suspended. That is to say that only 
2,618 perpetrators were sentenced to prison for DV.
Table 4. Attrition in domestic violence cases in Poland, 2018
Number of Blue Card forms (‘Form A’) (MRPiPS, 2019) 93,311
Number of perpetrators (Blue Cards) 73,654
Number of victims (Blue Cards) 88,133
Article 207 §1 – proceedings initiated (police) 28,014
Article 207 §1 – crimes recorded (police) 14,797
Article 207 §1 – perpetrators identified (police) 14,756
Article 207 §1 – adjudications (first instance) 13,422
Article 207 §1 – convictions (final judgements) 10,450
Article 207 §1 – prison sentences 7,937
Article 207 §1 – prison sentences executed (not suspended) 2,618






Table 4  shows that the attrition rates are quite high. For 73,654 people sus-
pected of inflicting violence and recorded in a Blue Card case (MRPiPS 2019: 76), 
only 2,618 were sentenced to imprisonment without suspension, that is, 3.3% 
(10.8% are sentenced to imprisonment in general). It is clear that most of the DV 
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cases do not reach the criminal justice system. Furthermore, only a few previously 
convicted perpetrators are issued protection orders or subjected to any kind of 
treatment.
5. A problem with Article 207 of the Polish Penal Code
5.1. Legal framework
The origin of the provision can be traced to the first Polish Penal Code from 1932. 
Lawmakers at that time proscribed in Article 246 abuse of dependent minors 
(that is to say, those under guardianship) and vulnerable individuals. Other family 
members, i.e. partners or healthy adult relations, were not protected. The equi- 
valent of that provision in the succeeding Penal Code of 1969 – Article 184 – 
expanded the scope of protected individuals and broadened the category to include 
all minors and adult dependent family members and vulnerable people, regardless 
their dependency. This was due to the merging of this article with another provi-
sion, Article 23  from the Combatting Alcoholism Act of 1959, which criminal-
ised the abuse of family members by someone under the influence of alcohol. The 
current Article 207 is a virtual copy of its legal predecessor from 1969 (Jodłowski 
and Szewczyk 2017).
Since the offence of maltreating a family member emerged in the Polish legal 
order in the context of addressing the consequences of alcohol abuse (not as 
a result of feminist activism), the problem of domestic abuse was framed primarily 
as being alcohol-abuse-related (Sienkiewicz 1985) and specific to the lower classes 
in society. That approach permeated the jurisprudence, and until the last few years 
public debate and political responses, as well.
Article 207 of the Penal Code is placed in Chapter XXVI ‘Crimes against family 
and guardianship’, that is to say, the primary legal interest protected is the integ-
rity and proper functioning of the family (Jodłowski and Szewczyk 2017: 857). The 
in fact means that the proper goal to achieve through criminal justice intervention 
is to uphold the integrity of the family unit. Some scholars add that the secondary 
legal interest protected is the individual’s interests, i.e. the life, health, and phys- 
ical and moral integrity of family members (Muszyńska 2014). However, these are 
only secondary.
The provision of Article 207 states:
[Physical and mental maltreatment of an immediate family member or a dependant 
person]
§1 Whoever physically or mentally maltreats an immediate family member or 
another person being in permanent or temporary relation of dependence to the 
perpetrator, is subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for between 3 months 
and 5 years.
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§1a Whoever physically or mentally maltreats a person who is helpless, due to this 
person’s age or mental or physical condition, is subject to the penalty of deprivation 
of liberty for between 6 months and 8 years.
§2 If the act referred to in §1 is coupled with the use of particular cruelty, the per-
petrator is subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for between 1 year and 
10 years.
§3 If the consequence of an act referred to in §1 or §2 is the harmed party’s attempt 
on his own life, the perpetrator is subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for 
between 2 years and 12 years.
At first glance, it seems that physical and mental maltreatment does not 
encompass exactly the same as the definition of ‘family violence’ from Article 2.2 of 
the Counteracting Family Violence Act. However, to understand the relationship 
between Polish domestic violence law and penal provisions – whether they cor-
respond and are a coherent whole – it is necessary to have a look at the dogmatic 
construction and jurisprudence on Article 207.
5.2. Jurisprudence and application
The scholarship and jurisprudence regarding Article 207 emphasise four con- 
stitutive elements that could cause a  behaviour to be considered a  crime of 
maltreating a family member. These elements dramatically limit the application.
The first element refers to mens rea, an intention. In Polish criminal legal 
theory, the scholarship distinguishes direct intention, i.e. the perpetrator intends to 
commit the act, he/she wants to commit it, and oblique intention, where the per-
petrator foresees the possibility of committing the act and accepts it (Article 9 §1 
of the Penal Code). The intention encompasses the goal of the actor, which in case 
of mistreating someone is to inflict physical or moral suffering, to harm someone.
The jurisprudence is predominantly of the opinion that the actor acts with the 
direct intention to cause harm (Marek 2010; Mozgawa 2018: 650; see e.g. IV KKN 
312/99 and V KKN 580/97), that is to say, his/her goal was to cause suffering and 
pain. When it comes to physical harm, it is not difficult to prove, since the victim 
has a medical certificate – the obviousness of the harm beyond question. When 
it comes to psychological harm, however, it may be difficult to demonstrate, as it 
is more intangible than physical injury. Moreover, it gets even more complicated, 
given that the point of reference is not the perspective and feelings of the victim, 
but an ‘objective judgement’ – the feelings of a reasonable citizen (Jodłowski and 
Szewczyk 2017, section 17), that is to say, an individual judge.
As an aside, one can ask, what are the criteria of the ‘harm’? Who decides 
what is enough harm to fulfil the conditions of Art. 207? This question is partic-
ularly relevant when it comes to psychological harm. According to the jurispru-
dence an objective assessment shall be applied, not the subjective feeling of the 
harmed person (that is to say, a rational, properly socialised adult, a model citizen). 
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This makes it almost virtually impossible to get a conviction for pure psychological 
abuse (with no accompanying physical abuse), especially in the context of gender- 
-based violence. According to the conception of coercive control, these are the 
most harmful abuses that women suffer from their intimate partners (Stark 2007).
Furthermore, when it comes to domestic abuse, the main goal of the perpet- 
rator is often not to inflict pain, to make the victim suffer, but merely to have 
control in the relationship, to dominate, to subordinate the victim. The perpet- 
rator does not necessarily care whether the victim suffers or not, and this depends 
very much on the victim’s individual capacities (Pospiszyl 1998). Since the inten-
tion must cover the consequence of the act – the physical or psychological suffer-
ing – it becomes difficult to prove mistreatment in court when there are no severe 
physical injuries. Mental states and feelings can be very subjective and gendered. 
Some behaviours which are devastating for some people can be seen as harmless 
and inconsequential by others.
The second element refers to a relationship of power or a preponderance of 
force between the perpetrator and the victim. The victim has to be dependent in 
relation to the perpetrator (materially, personally, emotionally, or contractually). 
The perpetrator mistreats the victim by using their power over them (Jodłowski 
and Szewczyk 2017, p. 32; III KK 262/6). The victim cannot resist, or only to some 
extent. This does not encompass mutual malicious teasing between spouses or ex-
spouses. The mutual violence or conflict between family members when there is no 
preponderance of force of one over another do not fall under the scope of Article 
207. Even if it sounds logical, this in fact leads to widespread confusion among the 
judiciary. The occurrence of violence is commonly confused with conflict (Wrona 
2017).
The third and fourth elements relate to the nature of the violent behaviour – 
its severity and frequency. Not every maltreatment can be qualified as an offence 
under Article 207. To meet the standards of Article 207 it must be severe (more 
than usual) and repeated, i.e. extended over time and incidents, not just a single 
act, but a series of behaviours. As an exception, it can be one incident, but a partic-
ularly cruel and violent one. The Court of Appeals in Gdańsk stated in a judgement 
from 2 April 2013 (II Aka 399/12):
Inflicting moral and psychological suffering on a victim in order to debase, 
humiliate, or tease her, no matter the motivation, shall not be ‘maltreating 
someone’ in the meaning of Article 207 §1, since it is not ‘severe’ and ‘beyond 
measure’, so by its intensity go beyond a usual violation of physical integrity, 
insulting, humiliation, or others kinds of defamation.
The conduct of the perpetrator must be intense, excessively painful, i.e. beyond 
measure, and the purpose foreseen in every single activity. Its intensity must go 
beyond the limits of ‘usual’ breaches of someone’s personal integrity/inviolability, 
180 Magdalena Grzyb
insults, debasement, and so forth (Supreme Court judgement, 6 August 1996, WR 
102/96).
Thus, Article 207 of the Penal Code is interpreted in a very restrictive way. It 
criminalises only severe and malicious forms of DV. Article 207 covers only DV 
which is ‘beyond measure’, as though abuse within whatever ‘measure’ is referred 
to is, from a criminal law standpoint, acceptable. This is precisely why Article 207 
does not include all behaviours or situations deemed as ‘family violence’ under 
Article 2.2 of the Counteracting Family Violence Act (Wrona 2011; Lewoc 2019).
It is worth noting that is has recently become possible to get a conviction for 
a different crime, e.g. homicide (Article 148 of the Penal Code), an injury (Article 
157), a lethal injury (Article 156), or a punishable threat (Article 190) in the cumu-
lative qualification (i.e. Art. 148 in conjunction with Art. 2.2 of the Counteracting 
Family Violence Act) with DV.
This trend is new for the Polish justice system, discretionary and introduced 
mainly for statistical purposes. The data are available from 2012, yet few courts use 
that cumulative qualification, so one cannot exactly ascertain an accurate propor-
tion of all convictions for a certain crime.
The basic penal provision referring to DV is still Article 207 §1. Since the pro-
vision embraces only a small proportion of all reported DV cases, it means that 
the protection measures, granted only when there is a  conviction, are available 
only for very few victims of domestic abuse. In practical terms, this means that 
most victims of DV are denied sufficient legal protection. Moreover, without going 
into a discussion of the effectiveness and deterring effect of the punishment, in the 
Polish legal order only a court during sentencing and in the case of conditional sus-
pension may oblige the defendant to undergo therapy for domestic abusers, which 
means that most domestic abusers go unpunished and there is no option to force 
them to change their behaviour.
Conclusion
The Polish legal system does address DV, but it does not criminalise it, or it crim- 
inalises it in an extremely limited way. The definition of family violence provided in 
Article 2.2 of the Counteracting Family Violence Act covers all forms of inflicting 
and using violence against a family member. In turn, Article 207 §1 of the Polish 
Penal Code covers only ‘abusive’ violence, which is to say, limited to severe and 
premeditated forms of DV. Its application in the penal decision-making process 
strengthens this gap. Article 207 and its legal interpretation covers only a tiny pro-
portion of all DV cases reported to the state agencies each year.
DV is practically not a  crime under Polish law, in the practice of the Polish 
justice system.
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Besides the penalties adjudicated for offences of Article 207, penal measures 
aimed at preventing or deterring further DV may sometimes be more efficient than 
a mere penalty, but they are only applied in cases of conviction under Article 207. 
Given that protection orders aimed at preventing or deterring further violence can 
only be adjudicated during the sentencing phase, very few DV victims are entitled 
to these orders, and fewer in fact receive them.
One of the reasons for this situation may be the culture of sentencing within 
the Polish judiciary (both in general and regarding DV cases) and the strong con-
servatism of Polish society and decision-makers. Given the primary legal interest 
protected by the provisions of Article 207 of the Penal Code, it turns out that the 
protection of family values by law-makers and the judiciary is often enforced at the 
expense of the victims’ right to a life free from violence.
The policy-makers in Poland by and large have not acknowledged that DV 
is a deep social problem and that the state apparatus should condemn it (Grzyb 
2019). Following the political transformation after 1989, the Polish welfare system 
and all of society underwent neoliberal reforms that did not leave or develop public 
resources to solve that multifaceted problem in an integrated way. The problem 
arises, however, when there is an actual decriminalisation of DV inscribed within 
a system of prevention.
Needless to say, the criminal justice response alone has not solved the very 
complex and deeply rooted problem of DV, though a factual criminalisation of the 
issue seems indispensable nowadays to convey the symbolic message that some 
behaviour is harmful and intolerable and that society wants to eradicate it. It seems, 
then, that without framing domestic abuse as a crime, and without effectively pro- 
secuting and punishing the perpetrators, eradicating the problem would be even 
harder to achieve.
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Abstrakt:  Powszechnie przyjmuje się, że art. 207 kodeksu karnego kryminalizujący znęcanie się 
nad najbliższymi osobami jest formą kryminalizacji przemocy domowej w polskim ustawodawstwie 
karnym. Jednak czy tak jest w  istocie? Gdy Polska ratyfikowała konwencję stambulską (Konwen-
cja Rady Europy ws. zwalczania przemocy domowej i przemocy wobec kobiet, CETS 210) w 2015 r. 
uznano, że nasze ustawodawstwo odnośnie do przemocy domowej spełnia wymogi konwencji, jeśli 
chodzi o zintegrowane, kompleksowe i  skoordynowane ogólnokrajowe strategie obejmujące środki 
mające na celu zapobieganie wszelkim formom przemocy objętych zakresem konwencji. Pod wzglę-
dem ścigania aktów przemocy domowej uznano, że art. 207 jest wystarczającym instrumentem praw-
nokarnym, by zadośćuczynić wymogom konwencji. W  artykule przedstawię polski system prze-
ciwdziałania przemocy w rodzinie ustanowiony w ustawie z 2005 r. oraz zarysuję wzajemne relacje 
między systemem z ustawy o przeciwdziałaniu przemocy w rodzinie a regulacjami prawnokarnymi, 
a dokładnie to, czy zachowanie stypizowane w art. 207 k.k. pokrywa się z ustawową definicją prze-
mocy w rodzinie. Te relacje bardzo wyraźnie obrazują liczby, które pokazują, że państwo polskie nie 
jest specjalnie responsywne na przemoc domową, a owa niska responsywność tylko po części wynika 
z  niedoskonałych przepisów prawa, a  w  ogromnej części z  pewnej inercji podmiotów stosujących 
prawo, archaicznej wykładni znamion omawianego przestępstwa i braku woli politycznej.
Słowa kluczowe:  przemoc domowa, przemoc wobec kobiet, Polska, prawo karne, konwencja 
stambulska
Introduction
One often can hear in Poland politicians saying that there is no violence against 
women in Poland, since Polish men respect their women and women hold a strong 
position in Polish culture and within the family. The conviction rates for domestic 
abuse in Poland are indeed low, though the attrition rates are high. Every year, for 
approximately 75,000 registered cases of domestic violence (DV), there are roughly 
10,000 convictions. Most of the prison sentences are conditionally suspended. 
Protective orders or other punitive measures are seldom handed down. There is 
a visible reluctance on the part of the criminal justice system to punish and correct 
domestic abusers.
When Poland ratified the Istanbul Convention (Council of Europe Conven-
tion on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence) 
in 2015, it was said that our domestic violence laws complied with the Conven-
tion’s requirements. Poland was said to be in compliance with the obligations of 
the Istanbul Convention in terms of providing comprehensive and coordinated 
policies which encompass all relevant measures to prevent and combat all forms 
of violence covered under the scope of this Convention and which offer a holistic 
response to violence against women (VAW). The only legal modification that was 
made by the legislature was to introduce ex officio prosecution for rape, which pre-
viously had to be initiated upon a complaint filed by the victim.
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Article 5.2 of the Convention provides an obligation to punish (criminalise) 
acts of violence covered by the Convention: ‘Parties shall take the necessary legis-
lative and other measures to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, punish, 
and provide reparation for acts of violence covered by the scope of this Convention 
that are perpetrated by non‐State actors.’
In terms of prosecuting DV, Poland was said to comply with the provisions of 
the Istanbul Convention, thanks to Article 207 of the Penal Code from 1997. So 
it was said, though the provision in question refers to behaviours that fall within 
what we call domestic abuse. This paper discusses the legal framework of DV pro-
visions in Poland, presents numbers that show high attrition rates, and finally ana- 
lyses the why the criminal justice system is nonresponsive towards domestic abuse.
Perhaps the statement that only a  small proportion of domestic abusers are 
convicted is not exceptionally insightful or illuminating, nor is it only a peculiar-
ity of the Polish system. The interesting question is why this is so. It seems that one 
of the reasons is the construction of the basic legal provision designed to cover DV, 
i.e. Article 207.
In particular, the question of culpability raises many challenges when it comes 
to prosecution. Firstly, we must look up the interpretation of Article 207 and the 
definition of ‘family violence’ specified in the Counteracting Family Violence Act. 
Finally, one has to explain how the understanding and interpretation of Article 207 
translates into the dynamics of sentencing and penal decision-making.
The paper is based on available data from two separate systems of reaction the 
so-called Blue Card data and criminal records. The difference between the two indic- 
ates a significant gap and raises doubts as to the adequacy of criminal responses, 
besides the more universal problem of the effectiveness of criminalising DV.
The quote in the title – by the government spokesperson in 2017, Beata 
Mazurek, commenting on the high-profile case of intimate partner violence by the 
local politician Rafał Piasecki – serves as a very accurate illustration of the solu-
tions we have in Poland: ‘I wish that in cases where there is an abuse of violence 
against women, the justice system worked efficiently’ (TVN24 2017).
1. The criminalisation of domestic violence
Domestic violence, and intimate partner violence in particular, is a  social phe- 
nomenon that affects a broad cross-section of the world’s population. It is not merely 
a social, political, or public health problem, but a very violation of our human rights, 
protected by international law. When it comes to Europe, there have been several 
sentences from the European Court of Human Rights to hold Council of Europe 
member states accountable for not providing protection and criminal recourses 
for victims of domestic violence (e.g. Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria 71127/01 from 
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12 June 2008; Opuz v. Turkey 33401/02 from 9 June 2009; Eremia and others v. The 
Republic of Moldova 3564/11 from 28 May 2013). The state is thus internationally 
obliged to provide victims with protection and to punish perpetrators.
Currently in the Western world, no-one denies the urge to punish domestic 
violence. To the contrary, the problem is rather that some states rely excessively 
on criminal justice responses whilst overlooking the complexity of the problem 
and the issues of social justice (Goodmark 2018). Instead of solving the problem, 
it exacerbates it.
In the past few decades there has been a co-optation of the feminist agenda 
with the emergent political and penal paradigms of ‘governing through crime’ 
(Simon 2007), the neoliberal penal state (Wacquant 2009), or the late-modern 
‘cultures of control’ (Garland 2001). It was visible not only in the United States, 
although the issue has so far been the most pronounced, perceived, and studied 
there. The feminist theorists have begun to explore how the feminist movement/
agenda in the United States helped to facilitate the carceral state and how it was 
used to legitimise and justify the expansion of the crime control agenda and puni-
tive policies of the contemporary state (Gottschalk 2006; Gruber 2007; Bumiller 
2008; Bernstein 2012).
A trend of excessive reliance on the criminal justice system to eradicate VAW 
in the USA was coined ‘carceral feminism’ (Bernstein 2012) and in the Latino 
world ‘punitive feminism’ (feminismo punitivo, Larrauri 2007). It refers to a ‘fem-
inism’ that calls for the criminalisation of the perpetrator and a harsher punitive 
response towards any acts of VAW. The underlying logic relies on increased poli- 
cing, legal frameworks and state intervention, and harsher punishments as appro-
priate responses to prevent VAW while simultaneously overlooking other non- 
-punitive social measures to prevent such violence.
Once the victims’ rights movement and discourse emerged in the public sphere 
in the late 1970s, it quickly took over feminist concerns for protecting women from 
violence and used them to achieve its own goals. Such a deviation/diversion from 
the primary goals of the feminist movement and the feminist alliance with the 
penal function of the state – a joining of forces with the neoliberal project of social 
control (Bumiller 2008: 15) – has proved to be adverse to women themselves. The 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), enacted in 1994, solidified the under-
standing of VAW as a principally criminal matter and was applauded by conser- 
vative political forces as another powerful symbol of the war on crime (Gottschalk 
2006: 152).
The ‘zero tolerance’ and tough-on-crime approach in cases of domestic abuse 
encompassed harsh measures that hardly improved women’s safety, but instead 
make them more vulnerable and disempowered in their lives – shifting control 
over their lives from their abusive husbands to a  paternalist state and criminal- 
ising their victimisation (Chesney-Lind 2006: 14). For example, in the USA, there 
is evidence that mandatory arrests, no-drop policies, and expanded definitions of 
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violence adopted by police departments have resulted in a greater risk for battered 
women to be arrested for domestic assault and the criminalisation of women who 
were merely defending themselves1 (Chesney-Lind 2006: 16). Furthermore, these 
policies have increased the probability that state protection agencies will remove the 
children of abused women from their homes after reports of violence which they 
could not be protected from witnessing or becoming the victims of (Gottschalk 
2006:  160). Additionally, abused women who live in public housing (abused by 
their non-resident partners) face eviction when reporting violence for exposure to 
violence of her neighbours (Simon 2007: 197).
Framing VAW as mainly a  legal and law enforcement problem was useful in 
terms of deviating attention from the shrinking social functions of the state and its 
welfare resources which actually could better address the needs of abused women, 
and in a  much less constraining way. The emphasis of DV criminalisation has 
come at the cost of deflecting focus from economic empowerment, education, and 
other non-punitive goals (Gruber 2007: 819). By embracing harsh criminalisation 
policies and resorting to the penal apparatus of the neoliberal paternalistic state 
without addressing any larger social issues or underlying conditions that are root 
causes of VAW (economic empowerment, education, or gender stereotypes), the 
state reinforces inequality rather than dismantling it, and so strays from the under-
lying values of the feminist movement – the equality and autonomy of women.
On the other hand, this inclusion of a  feminist agenda in a penal and crime 
control framework also might be seen as policymakers’ symbolic recognition of 
the importance of the problem. In times of late (Giddens 1990) or liquid (Bauman 
2000) modernity, when we are witnessing the decline of the power of the traditional 
sovereign state, criminal law has become the last powerful tool by which the state 
can assert its power. Globalisation and neo-liberal policies increased the exclusion 
and hardship of specific social groups, thus creating new problems of order and 
new fears and anxieties (Garland 2001: 153). The criminalisation of social prob-
lems, in situations when social policies and resources are no longer available (and 
certainly not as effective or spectacular) to address the social conditions that pro-
duced them, has become the easiest way to demonstrate the state’s power (or effic- 
acy of politicians) and its concern for the well-being and safety of its citizens.
Addressing VAW as a mainly criminal matter is yet another example of ‘govern-
ing through crime’. This in fact means making crime (criminal law, crime control 
field, and popular crime narratives) available outside its original, limited subject 
domains and making it a powerful tool with which to interpret and frame all forms 
of social action as a problem of governance (Simon 2007: 17). When something is 
1 For example, because of dual arrest policies, which refers to situations where police officers 
cannot identify the primary aggressor, and detains both parties. Law enforcement agencies developed 
an expansive definition of DV that fails to distinguish between aggressive/instigating violence and self- 
-defensive/retaliatory violence (Chesney-Lind 2006: 16).
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framed as a problem of governance, the suggestion is that it is possible to regulate 
or solve by political and immediate measures.
This trend – an alliance, or rather appropriation, of the feminist agenda by 
‘tough-on-crime’ politicians – however, was not observed in Poland. Despite the 
Polish politicians’ readiness to resort to criminal law for any social problem in the 
last two decades (Grzyb 2017), they never brought DV into play in such a way. The 
system of prevention beginning in 2005 does not resort to criminal law, although 
many effective remedies are in fact only available to the victims when they decide 
to start criminal proceedings.
2. Preventing domestic violence in Poland
Since 2005, when the Sejm adopted the Counteracting Family Violence Act, there 
has been a dual track for reacting to domestic violence. The system for counteract-
ing family violence (Polish lawmakers adopted the term ‘family violence’) which 
was enacted in the bill is run by the public administration and the criminal justice 
track. These two tracks do not actually overlap, though the key role in both cases is 
assigned to the police.
The Counteracting Family Violence Act of 29 July 2005 established a system 
of comprehensive measures and obligations of the public institutions (at both the 
central and local levels) to protect victims of domestic violence.
Article 2.2 of this law defines ‘family violence’ as a single or recurring wilful 
action or negligence which infringes upon the personal rights or well-being of the 
persons listed in Point 1 (i.e. a family member – a close relative or other person 
sharing the residence or household), in particular, exposing them to the risk of 
losing life or health, compromising their dignity, physical integrity, or freedom – 
including sexual freedom – causing harm to their physical or mental health, and 
causing pain and moral suffering in those who are subjected to violence.
Given the definition of DV enacted by Article 3(b) of the Istanbul Convention,2 
the Polish provision omits economic abuse and also overlooks the problem of 
violence between former intimate partners who do not live together or do not 
share households.
2 Article 3 of the Istanbul Convention defines VAW and DV as follows:
•	 ‘violence against women’ is understood as a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination 
against women and shall mean all acts of gender‐based violence that result in, or are likely to result 
in, physical, sexual, psychological, or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats of 
such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life
•	 ‘domestic violence’ shall mean all acts of physical, sexual, psychological, or economic violence that 
occur within the family or domestic unit or between former or current spouses or partners, whether 
or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the victim.
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The lawmakers adopted a gender-neutral approach, which is to say there is not 
a single reference throughout the whole document to the fact that women are more 
likely to suffer from DV and that men are more likely to perpetrate it. The Act uses 
the neutral term ‘victim’.
Under the provisions of the Act, a  person suffering from DV is entitled to 
several forms of assistance (Art.  3):  medical, psychological, legal, social, profes-
sional, and family counselling; crisis intervention and support; protection from 
further harm by preventing the abusers from using a home occupied jointly with 
other family members and prohibiting contact with a victim via restraining orders 
to stay away from them; safe shelter in a specialised support centre for victims of 
DV; medical examination to identify the causes and types of injuries resulting from 
DV and to issue a medical certificate in that respect; assistance in finding a place to 
live for people who experience DV and do not have legal title to the premises occu-
pied with the perpetrator. The perpetrators instead shall be subjected to measured 
aimed at preventing contact with the victims and at corrective and educational 
measures (Art. 4).
In general, the Act is in line with the standards set by the Istanbul Convention; 
therefore, when Poland signed and ratified the Convention in 2015, no changes 
were made.
A key procedure in response to family violence enacted in 2005 is the ‘Blue Card’ 
procedure (Article 9d). A Blue Card is a  form of intervention within the family 
where DV occurs. It is a procedure that provides assistance to a family affected by 
violence, both those suffering and those inflicting violence. The approach adopted 
by the lawmakers and in the Blue Card procedure identifies DV not only as a legal 
problem, but also a health, psychological, and social problem.
The procedure takes a comprehensive and coordinated approach. It is run by 
an interdisciplinary council at the municipality level, composed of representat- 
ives from 1) social welfare, 2) municipality committees for solving alcohol prob-
lems, 3) the police, 4) education institutions, 5) healthcare institutions, and 6) non- 
-governmental organisations (Article 9a).
The Blue Card system was initially introduced in 1998 to regulate police inter-
vention and interaction with families experiencing DV. The questionnaire was 
printed on blue paper, hence the name of the procedure. Originally, in the mid-90s 
it was intended to detect alcohol-related DV, provide some assistance to affected 
families, and monitor the family situation.
Until 2010 such procedures were initiated by the police. After a 2010 amend-
ment to the Act, the procedure can be initiated by a social worker, healthcare pro-
fessional, or other public functionary, although almost 80% of all Blue Card cases 
are still initiated by the police (MRPiPS 2019: 173).
The Blue Card procedures shall be initiated by means of filling in the Blue Card 
form in the event of a suspicion of domestic violence arising in the course of per-
forming professional tasks, or as a  result of notification by a  family member or 
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a witness to domestic violence (Art. 9d.4). To open a case, the consent of the victim 
is not required (Art. 9d.1).
The Blue Card form is comprised of forms entitled A, B, C, and D. Form A is 
the report of the police intervention itself or of the professional initiating the pro-
cedure. It is done in the presence of the victim. Form B is a useful piece of informa-
tion for the victim, describing the violence, her rights, and the places she can seek 
help. Form C is completed at the meeting of an interdisciplinary team (or working 
group) in the presence of the suspected victim, acting as a  kind of diagnosis of 
the situation and a personalised assistance plan tailored to the individual victim. 
Form D, finally, is also filled in by the professionals during the meeting, in the pres-
ence of the suspected perpetrator of the violence. During the course of the case and 
the realisation of the assistance plan, the family is monitored and assisted by the 
police officers and/or social workers. The procedure is deemed complete when the 
interdisciplinary team decides the plan has been executed and that further actions 
are unwarranted or the problem has been solved.
Besides the Blue Card procedure, the Counteracting Family Violence Act 
imposes obligations on both local authorities – the development and implement- 
ation of a programme for preventing DV (Art. 6) – and the central administra-
tion – developing a National Programme for the Prevention of Domestic Violence 
(Art. 8) – as well as providing infrastructure for the victims (e.g. support centres) 
and developing corrective and educational measures for perpetrators (Art. 6.4).
The Act also provides specific measures in cases of violence, i.e. eviction orders 
issued by a civil court on the demand of the victim (Art. 11a). Social workers also 
have the right to remove a child from a family in the event of a direct risk to the 
child’s life or health due to domestic violence (Art. 12a). When a perpetrator of 
violence is on parole or probation for committing acts of violence or threats against 
family members, the probation officer also has the right to file a motion to execute 
the penalty of imprisonment or to revoke the parole (Art. 12d).
Finally, in the event a  professional suspects an offence of injuries or do- 
mestic abuse in the course of performing their duties, the professional shall report 
it as a  crime to the police, or a  police officer shall initiate criminal proceedings 
(Art. 12). It needs to be emphasised that opening a Blue Card case, even by a police 
officer, does not at all equate to pressing criminal charges against the perpetrator. 
The provisions of Article 12, the Act, and the system for preventing domestic viol- 
ence do not have recourse at any time to the criminal justice system.
9‘We condemn abusing violence against women’: The criminalization of domestic violence in Poland 
3. Prosecuting domestic violence in Poland
The second track of addressing domestic violence is to start criminal proceedings. 
When a person experiences domestic abuse, apart from opening a Blue Card case, 
they may press charges against the perpetrator.
In the Polish Penal Code of 1997, Article 207 criminalises offences of maltreat-
ment of family members or vulnerable persons, which is described as ‘domestic viol- 
ence crime’. Otherwise, a victim may press charges for some other offences: injury 
(Art. 157), punishable threats (Art. 191), or rape (Art. 197); however, Article 207 is 
deemed to be the basic type for behaviour which falls under DV, and it represents 
the majority of convictions (which is elaborated on later).
Starting criminal proceedings and reaching a  conviction – apart from the 
penalty – provides the judge with several options regarding the perpetrators of 
domestic abuse which aim to protect the victim. Along with a conviction, the court 
may (although it is not mandatory) issue
•	 a restraining and barring order
 – prohibiting the guilty party from contacting certain individuals,
 – prohibiting them from approaching certain individuals, or
 – prohibiting them from leaving a specific area without the court’s permission 
[Art. 39.2b], or
•	 an eviction order – the order to vacate the premises which the guilty party 
shares with the victim [Art. 39.2e].
An eviction order may be issued by the prosecutor before a conviction. The 
police, however, have no right to issue an eviction or restraining order in emer-
gency situations, during police intervention.
Furthermore, when conditionally suspending the enforcement of the penalty 
imposed, the court may impose an obligation:
5) to abstain from abusing alcohol or from using other stupefacient substances
6) to submit to treatment (e.g. for alcoholism) or to therapeutic activities
6a) to participate in correctional/educational activities (therapy for domestic 
abusers)
7) to refrain from associating with specific social groups or visiting specific loca-
tions
7a) to refrain from contacting the harmed party or from approaching them 
[Art. 72]
At first glance, it seems that Polish criminal law does adequately address the 
problem of domestic violence. The Penal Code does criminalise the conduct of 
domestic abuse or other forms of violence against family members. The senten- 
cing rules and existing measures (i.e. barring and protection orders) do not aim to 
merely punish the perpetrators, but also to protect the victims.
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However, all of these measures or obligations that often proved to be efficient 
deterrents rather than ‘just deserts’ in terms of stopping and preventing further 
abuse are seldom imposed and only used in criminal proceedings, even if some of 
them can be issued before the sentencing phase. That is to say, they are not avail-
able for victims who have had a Blue Card procedure initiated but who have not 
pressed charges.
Only in April 2020 the Polish house of parliament passed a  law providing 
immediate restraining and eviction orders for the perpetrators of domestic abuse 
issued by police officers upon intervention (up to 14  days) (Ministry of Justice 
2020). The law is expected to come into force in 2020.
Moreover, in fact, a provision in Polish Penal Code regarding domestic abuse 
(Article 207 of the Polish Penal Code from 1997) criminalises a  very different 
behaviour than is defined in the Counteracting Family Violence Act of 2005. The 
numbers on DV and attrition rates clearly demonstrate the discrepancy.
4. Domestic violence figures in Poland
Because DV has a very high proportion of unreported cases, victimisation surveys 
can be a  reliable source of information on its prevalence. The rates obtained in 
surveys may differ, but presenting these numbers is a good starting point for dis-
cussing the official number of reported cases.
4.1. Victimisation surveys
The first Polish victimisation survey on VAW was conducted by Beata Gruszczyńska 
(2007:  58–63) in the framework of the International Violence Against Women 
Survey (IVAWS). The survey was carried out in 2004 among a  sample of 2,000 
women aged 18–70. The results revealed that 34.6% of women had experienced 
physical or sexual violence in their lifetime, out of which 15.6% were victimised by 
their partner. Physical violence was experienced by 18.1% of respondents, 15.1% of 
which was from their partner. Within the 12 months prior to the survey, 5.1% of 
respondents had experienced physical violence, and 1.6% sexual violence.
Slightly different, though comparable, rates were reported in the ‘Violence 
against women: An EU-wide survey’, published by the Fundamental Rights Agency 
in 2014. The survey was conducted on a European sample of 42,000 women (over 
15 years of age) from EU28 countries – approx. 1,500 women from each country 
– and covered a wide range of abuse: physical abuse, sexual abuse, psychological 
violence, stalking, and sexual harassment. The study found that 13% of women 
had experienced physical or sexual violence from a partner since the age of 15 (4% 
within the previous 12 months), 11% from a non-partner, and 19% overall from 
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a partner or non-partner. 37% of women reported having been subjected to psy-
chological violence (FRA 2014).
The third survey worth mentioning is the study commissioned in 2014 by the 
Polish Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Policy, which is in charge of coordin- 
ating the system for preventing domestic violence. It was carried out on a sample 
of 3,000 men and women who were asked about physical, psychological, sexual, 
and economic violence. According to that study, 26.8% of women and 22.3% of 
men had experienced violence within their lifetime. Of the respondents, 16.8% had 
experienced physical violence, 20.3% psychological violence, and 2.7% sexual viol- 
ence. In a very similar study commissioned by the Ministry of Family, Labour, and 
Social Policy in 2010, 39.4% of women reported experiencing violence during their 
lifetime (Miedzik and Godlewska-Szurkowa 2014: 68).
4.2. Blue Card statistics
Another source of information are the Blue Card statistics published annually by 
the Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Policy. Thanks to an amendment of the 
Counteracting Family Violence Act made in 2010, comparable statistics have been 
collected since 2012. One can tell there is quite a stable trend. Each year, between 
90,000 and 100,000 Blue Card cases are started. One-fifth (18.4% in 2014) of them 
are reports on subsequent incidents, and four-fifths (81.6% in 2014) are new cases.3 
Based on police records, 92% of the perpetrators are men and 70% of the victims 
are women (a further 15% are children).
The efficiency of Blue Card procedures is rather low. Every year, there are 
approximately 70,000 Blue Cards are finalised, 70% of them because the violence 
has stopped or there are reasonable grounds to believe it has stopped, and 30% 
because there is no reason to take further action. In 2016, the Supreme Audit Office 
(Polish constitutional agency) published a  report on assistance and services for 
victims of DV and an evaluation of the Blue Card procedure. The report revealed 
that in only 2.6% of the cases studied did the violence stop; in 13% of cases a com-
pleted procedure had been reopened (NIK 2016: 11). Nonetheless, 61% of people 
receiving assistance said their situation had somehow improved or they were 
feeling better, and only 1.5% were feeling worse.
3  While interpreting Blue Card statistics, one must bear in mind a few reservations. The stat- 
istics are collected on the basis of completed forms A, C, and D. The numbers presented here refer 
to A forms, which technically initiate the procedure. Firstly, if the interdisciplinary team in its work 
discovers that the suspect was not the perpetrator, this fact is not reflected in the statistics. Secondly, 
a procedure in one year can pertain to one family in different configurations. It may happen that one 
person is simultaneously a victim and a perpetrator (e.g. they may suffer violence from their partner 
and inflict violence on their child). Thirdly, there is sometimes the problem of mutual accusations – 
a wife opens a Blue Card case against her husband, and vice versa. All of these issues require caution 
from researchers whilst interpreting Blue Card statistics.
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Table 1. The Blue Card procedure
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Number of Blue Card 
forms 63,820 73,119 99,093 99,749 97,224 98,307 93,311
Number of Blue Card 
forms filled in by the 
police
51,236 61,047 77,808 75,495 73,531 75,662 73,153
Number of 
perpetrators (only 
police Blue Card 
records)
51,531 61,450 78,489 74,155 74,155 76,206 73,654
Number of victims 105,332 97,501 91,789 92,529 88,133
Percentage of female 
victims 69.1 71.15 72.9 73.47 73.8
Source: Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Policy [MRPiPS] (2015; 2019).
The Blue Card statistics suggest that each year there are at least 60,000–70,000 
recorded cases of Article 207 offences or related crimes. This is not the case, though. 
These numbers are in stark contrast with the criminal justice statistics.
4.3. Criminal Justice Statistics
It is still virtually impossible to count all convictions related to DV, since the courts 
are not obliged to mention in their sentences that an offence was committed in the 
context of DV, which would subsequently be a  ticked box in the statistics. Since 
2011, it has been possible to extract from judicial statistics figures on crimes com-
mitted against an immediate family member, e.g. injuries, threats, or rape, but 
that joint qualification is still not mandatory for judges in the sentencing phase or 
during statistical reporting. Nevertheless, there is a growing tendency among the 
judiciary to indicate such cases in their sentences.
Moreover, it is important to emphasise that not every conviction from Article 
207 §1 was related to DV. Article 207 protects family members and vulnerable 
persons from maltreatment; thus, the victim may be a student maltreated by a pro-
fessor or an employee harassed by a superior, though these are a tiny proportion of 
all cases. To illustrate the breakdown, in 2018 70.3% of all convictions for crimes 
related to DV were for Article 207 §1 (Lewoc 2019), and among all convictions for 
Article 207 §1, 88.6% (in the final judgement, 84% in the first instance) were for 
maltreatment of a family member.
Thus, despite the fact that Article 207 of the Penal Code does not include all 
recorded cases that can be considered DV, it still remains the basic penal provi-
sion for addressing DV. Therefore, Article 207 figures remain the most accurate 
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portrayal of criminal justice. In particular, §1 (and since 2016, §1a as well) of 
Article 207 covers the vast majority of cases tried in relation to domestic abuse.
Table 2. Numbers of reported and recorded crimes (police records) and judicial 
statistics on adjudications (first instance) and final convictions (second instance)
Article 207 §1,  
Penal Code 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Reported crimes 30,534 29,958 29,193 29,879 30,901 27,642 26,633 28,608 28,014
Recorded crimes 18,759 18,832 17,785 17,513 17,523 14,191 15,513 15,730 14,797
Adjudications
(first instance) 16,239 13,588 11,937 14,132 15,001 14,400 12,846 13,252 13,422
Convictions  
(final judgments) 13,484 13,153 12,318 11,593 11,282 10,533 10,572 9,755 10,450
Source: Ministry of Justice, Bureau of Statistics.
Out of 10,450 convicted individuals in 2018 (final judgements) for Art. 207 §1:
•	 221 were sentenced to mixed penalties,
•	 397 were given a fine,
•	 1,895 were sentenced to community service, and
•	 7,937 were sentenced to imprisonment.














Source: Ministry of Justice, Bureau of Statistics.
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Table 3. Length of prison sentence
Imprisonment Total: 7,937 100%
3–12 months 7,415 93.4%
1–2 years 460 5.8%
2–5 years 62 0.8%
Source: Ministry of Justice, Bureau of Statistics.
The offence of maltreatment of an immediate family member is punishable by 
between 3 months and 5 years of imprisonment. Most of the prison sentences are 
for the mandatory minimum sentence, up to one year (93.4%). Furthermore, 67% 
(5,319) of all prison sentences are conditionally suspended. That is to say that only 
2,618 perpetrators were sentenced to prison for DV.
Table 4. Attrition in domestic violence cases in Poland, 2018
Number of Blue Card forms (‘Form A’) (MRPiPS, 2019) 93,311
Number of perpetrators (Blue Cards) 73,654
Number of victims (Blue Cards) 88,133
Article 207 §1 – proceedings initiated (police) 28,014
Article 207 §1 – crimes recorded (police) 14,797
Article 207 §1 – perpetrators identified (police) 14,756
Article 207 §1 – adjudications (first instance) 13,422
Article 207 §1 – convictions (final judgements) 10,450
Article 207 §1 – prison sentences 7,937
Article 207 §1 – prison sentences executed (not suspended) 2,618






Table 4  shows that the attrition rates are quite high. For 73,654 people sus-
pected of inflicting violence and recorded in a Blue Card case (MRPiPS 2019: 76), 
only 2,618 were sentenced to imprisonment without suspension, that is, 3.3% 
(10.8% are sentenced to imprisonment in general). It is clear that most of the DV 
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cases do not reach the criminal justice system. Furthermore, only a few previously 
convicted perpetrators are issued protection orders or subjected to any kind of 
treatment.
5. A problem with Article 207 of the Polish Penal Code
5.1. Legal framework
The origin of the provision can be traced to the first Polish Penal Code from 1932. 
Lawmakers at that time proscribed in Article 246 abuse of dependent minors 
(that is to say, those under guardianship) and vulnerable individuals. Other family 
members, i.e. partners or healthy adult relations, were not protected. The equi- 
valent of that provision in the succeeding Penal Code of 1969 – Article 184 – 
expanded the scope of protected individuals and broadened the category to include 
all minors and adult dependent family members and vulnerable people, regardless 
their dependency. This was due to the merging of this article with another provi-
sion, Article 23  from the Combatting Alcoholism Act of 1959, which criminal-
ised the abuse of family members by someone under the influence of alcohol. The 
current Article 207 is a virtual copy of its legal predecessor from 1969 (Jodłowski 
and Szewczyk 2017).
Since the offence of maltreating a family member emerged in the Polish legal 
order in the context of addressing the consequences of alcohol abuse (not as 
a result of feminist activism), the problem of domestic abuse was framed primarily 
as being alcohol-abuse-related (Sienkiewicz 1985) and specific to the lower classes 
in society. That approach permeated the jurisprudence, and until the last few years 
public debate and political responses, as well.
Article 207 of the Penal Code is placed in Chapter XXVI ‘Crimes against family 
and guardianship’, that is to say, the primary legal interest protected is the integ-
rity and proper functioning of the family (Jodłowski and Szewczyk 2017: 857). The 
in fact means that the proper goal to achieve through criminal justice intervention 
is to uphold the integrity of the family unit. Some scholars add that the secondary 
legal interest protected is the individual’s interests, i.e. the life, health, and phys- 
ical and moral integrity of family members (Muszyńska 2014). However, these are 
only secondary.
The provision of Article 207 states:
[Physical and mental maltreatment of an immediate family member or a dependant 
person]
§1 Whoever physically or mentally maltreats an immediate family member or 
another person being in permanent or temporary relation of dependence to the 
perpetrator, is subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for between 3 months 
and 5 years.
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§1a Whoever physically or mentally maltreats a person who is helpless, due to this 
person’s age or mental or physical condition, is subject to the penalty of deprivation 
of liberty for between 6 months and 8 years.
§2 If the act referred to in §1 is coupled with the use of particular cruelty, the per-
petrator is subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for between 1 year and 
10 years.
§3 If the consequence of an act referred to in §1 or §2 is the harmed party’s attempt 
on his own life, the perpetrator is subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for 
between 2 years and 12 years.
At first glance, it seems that physical and mental maltreatment does not 
encompass exactly the same as the definition of ‘family violence’ from Article 2.2 of 
the Counteracting Family Violence Act. However, to understand the relationship 
between Polish domestic violence law and penal provisions – whether they cor-
respond and are a coherent whole – it is necessary to have a look at the dogmatic 
construction and jurisprudence on Article 207.
5.2. Jurisprudence and application
The scholarship and jurisprudence regarding Article 207 emphasise four con- 
stitutive elements that could cause a  behaviour to be considered a  crime of 
maltreating a family member. These elements dramatically limit the application.
The first element refers to mens rea, an intention. In Polish criminal legal 
theory, the scholarship distinguishes direct intention, i.e. the perpetrator intends to 
commit the act, he/she wants to commit it, and oblique intention, where the per-
petrator foresees the possibility of committing the act and accepts it (Article 9 §1 
of the Penal Code). The intention encompasses the goal of the actor, which in case 
of mistreating someone is to inflict physical or moral suffering, to harm someone.
The jurisprudence is predominantly of the opinion that the actor acts with the 
direct intention to cause harm (Marek 2010; Mozgawa 2018: 650; see e.g. IV KKN 
312/99 and V KKN 580/97), that is to say, his/her goal was to cause suffering and 
pain. When it comes to physical harm, it is not difficult to prove, since the victim 
has a medical certificate – the obviousness of the harm beyond question. When 
it comes to psychological harm, however, it may be difficult to demonstrate, as it 
is more intangible than physical injury. Moreover, it gets even more complicated, 
given that the point of reference is not the perspective and feelings of the victim, 
but an ‘objective judgement’ – the feelings of a reasonable citizen (Jodłowski and 
Szewczyk 2017, section 17), that is to say, an individual judge.
As an aside, one can ask, what are the criteria of the ‘harm’? Who decides 
what is enough harm to fulfil the conditions of Art. 207? This question is partic-
ularly relevant when it comes to psychological harm. According to the jurispru-
dence an objective assessment shall be applied, not the subjective feeling of the 
harmed person (that is to say, a rational, properly socialised adult, a model citizen). 
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This makes it almost virtually impossible to get a conviction for pure psychological 
abuse (with no accompanying physical abuse), especially in the context of gender- 
-based violence. According to the conception of coercive control, these are the 
most harmful abuses that women suffer from their intimate partners (Stark 2007).
Furthermore, when it comes to domestic abuse, the main goal of the perpet- 
rator is often not to inflict pain, to make the victim suffer, but merely to have 
control in the relationship, to dominate, to subordinate the victim. The perpet- 
rator does not necessarily care whether the victim suffers or not, and this depends 
very much on the victim’s individual capacities (Pospiszyl 1998). Since the inten-
tion must cover the consequence of the act – the physical or psychological suffer-
ing – it becomes difficult to prove mistreatment in court when there are no severe 
physical injuries. Mental states and feelings can be very subjective and gendered. 
Some behaviours which are devastating for some people can be seen as harmless 
and inconsequential by others.
The second element refers to a relationship of power or a preponderance of 
force between the perpetrator and the victim. The victim has to be dependent in 
relation to the perpetrator (materially, personally, emotionally, or contractually). 
The perpetrator mistreats the victim by using their power over them (Jodłowski 
and Szewczyk 2017, p. 32; III KK 262/6). The victim cannot resist, or only to some 
extent. This does not encompass mutual malicious teasing between spouses or ex-
spouses. The mutual violence or conflict between family members when there is no 
preponderance of force of one over another do not fall under the scope of Article 
207. Even if it sounds logical, this in fact leads to widespread confusion among the 
judiciary. The occurrence of violence is commonly confused with conflict (Wrona 
2017).
The third and fourth elements relate to the nature of the violent behaviour – 
its severity and frequency. Not every maltreatment can be qualified as an offence 
under Article 207. To meet the standards of Article 207 it must be severe (more 
than usual) and repeated, i.e. extended over time and incidents, not just a single 
act, but a series of behaviours. As an exception, it can be one incident, but a partic-
ularly cruel and violent one. The Court of Appeals in Gdańsk stated in a judgement 
from 2 April 2013 (II Aka 399/12):
Inflicting moral and psychological suffering on a victim in order to debase, 
humiliate, or tease her, no matter the motivation, shall not be ‘maltreating 
someone’ in the meaning of Article 207 §1, since it is not ‘severe’ and ‘beyond 
measure’, so by its intensity go beyond a usual violation of physical integrity, 
insulting, humiliation, or others kinds of defamation.
The conduct of the perpetrator must be intense, excessively painful, i.e. beyond 
measure, and the purpose foreseen in every single activity. Its intensity must go 
beyond the limits of ‘usual’ breaches of someone’s personal integrity/inviolability, 
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insults, debasement, and so forth (Supreme Court judgement, 6 August 1996, WR 
102/96).
Thus, Article 207 of the Penal Code is interpreted in a very restrictive way. It 
criminalises only severe and malicious forms of DV. Article 207 covers only DV 
which is ‘beyond measure’, as though abuse within whatever ‘measure’ is referred 
to is, from a criminal law standpoint, acceptable. This is precisely why Article 207 
does not include all behaviours or situations deemed as ‘family violence’ under 
Article 2.2 of the Counteracting Family Violence Act (Wrona 2011; Lewoc 2019).
It is worth noting that is has recently become possible to get a conviction for 
a different crime, e.g. homicide (Article 148 of the Penal Code), an injury (Article 
157), a lethal injury (Article 156), or a punishable threat (Article 190) in the cumu-
lative qualification (i.e. Art. 148 in conjunction with Art. 2.2 of the Counteracting 
Family Violence Act) with DV.
This trend is new for the Polish justice system, discretionary and introduced 
mainly for statistical purposes. The data are available from 2012, yet few courts use 
that cumulative qualification, so one cannot exactly ascertain an accurate propor-
tion of all convictions for a certain crime.
The basic penal provision referring to DV is still Article 207 §1. Since the pro-
vision embraces only a small proportion of all reported DV cases, it means that 
the protection measures, granted only when there is a  conviction, are available 
only for very few victims of domestic abuse. In practical terms, this means that 
most victims of DV are denied sufficient legal protection. Moreover, without going 
into a discussion of the effectiveness and deterring effect of the punishment, in the 
Polish legal order only a court during sentencing and in the case of conditional sus-
pension may oblige the defendant to undergo therapy for domestic abusers, which 
means that most domestic abusers go unpunished and there is no option to force 
them to change their behaviour.
Conclusion
The Polish legal system does address DV, but it does not criminalise it, or it crim- 
inalises it in an extremely limited way. The definition of family violence provided in 
Article 2.2 of the Counteracting Family Violence Act covers all forms of inflicting 
and using violence against a family member. In turn, Article 207 §1 of the Polish 
Penal Code covers only ‘abusive’ violence, which is to say, limited to severe and 
premeditated forms of DV. Its application in the penal decision-making process 
strengthens this gap. Article 207 and its legal interpretation covers only a tiny pro-
portion of all DV cases reported to the state agencies each year.
DV is practically not a  crime under Polish law, in the practice of the Polish 
justice system.
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Besides the penalties adjudicated for offences of Article 207, penal measures 
aimed at preventing or deterring further DV may sometimes be more efficient than 
a mere penalty, but they are only applied in cases of conviction under Article 207. 
Given that protection orders aimed at preventing or deterring further violence can 
only be adjudicated during the sentencing phase, very few DV victims are entitled 
to these orders, and fewer in fact receive them.
One of the reasons for this situation may be the culture of sentencing within 
the Polish judiciary (both in general and regarding DV cases) and the strong con-
servatism of Polish society and decision-makers. Given the primary legal interest 
protected by the provisions of Article 207 of the Penal Code, it turns out that the 
protection of family values by law-makers and the judiciary is often enforced at the 
expense of the victims’ right to a life free from violence.
The policy-makers in Poland by and large have not acknowledged that DV 
is a deep social problem and that the state apparatus should condemn it (Grzyb 
2019). Following the political transformation after 1989, the Polish welfare system 
and all of society underwent neoliberal reforms that did not leave or develop public 
resources to solve that multifaceted problem in an integrated way. The problem 
arises, however, when there is an actual decriminalisation of DV inscribed within 
a system of prevention.
Needless to say, the criminal justice response alone has not solved the very 
complex and deeply rooted problem of DV, though a factual criminalisation of the 
issue seems indispensable nowadays to convey the symbolic message that some 
behaviour is harmful and intolerable and that society wants to eradicate it. It seems, 
then, that without framing domestic abuse as a crime, and without effectively pro- 
secuting and punishing the perpetrators, eradicating the problem would be even 
harder to achieve.
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